May 13, 2025 MIR-25-20

Fire aboard Fishing Vessel *Jordyn Rose*

On June 24, 2024, about 1030 local time, the fishing vessel *Jordyn Rose* caught fire while it was beached near the mouth of the Naknek River near Naknek, Alaska (see figure 1 and figure 2).[1] The captain, the only person on board at the time, abandoned the vessel onto the beach. There were no injuries, and no pollution was reported. The vessel was a total loss, valued at $910,000.[2]

Figure 1. *Jordyn Rose* on fire on June 24, 2024. (Source: *Jordyn Rose* captain)

[1] In this report, all times are Alaska daylight time, and all miles are in nautical miles (1.15 statute miles).

[2] Visit ntsb.gov to find additional information in the public docket for this NTSB investigation (case no. DCA24FM050). Use the CAROL Query to search investigations.

Casualty Summary

Casualty type	Fire/Explosion
Location	Naknek River, Naknek, Alaska 58°43.50′ N, 157°03.55′ W
Date	June 24, 2024
Time	1030 Alaska daylight time (coordinated universal time –8 hrs)
Persons on board	1
Injuries	None
Property damage	$910,000
Environmental damage	None
Weather	Visibility 9 nm, overcast, winds south 8–9 kts, air temperature 47°F
Waterway information	River bank



Figure 2. Area where the fire aboard the *Jordyn Rose* occurred, as indicated by a circled *X*. (Background source: Google Maps)

1 Factual Information

On June 24, 2024, at 0400, the captain and a deckhand launched the 32-foot-long fiberglass commercial fishing vessel (gillnetter) *Jordyn Rose* at a boat yard in Naknek, Alaska, and got underway on the Naknek River to participate in the Alaska salmon fishery. About 0430, the *Jordyn Rose* arrived at a nearby fuel dock for fuel, ice, and provisions, but the dock was full, so they continued into Kvichak Bay.

About 0700, while the vessel was underway near the mouth of the Naknek River, there was an issue with the vessel's propulsion engine throttle controls, which limited the vessel's maneuverability. The captain was unable to resolve the issue, and, about 0730, he decided to drop the anchor. However, when the deckhand attempted to drop the anchor, the lever to release the clutch on the windlass broke off, and the anchor held fast. The vessel was adrift with limited maneuverability—the captain told investigators that the engine would "kick in and kick out [of gear]." To avoid being carried into Kvichak Bay by the outgoing tide, the captain decided to intentionally ground (beach) the vessel.[3]

About 0800, the captain was able to point the *Jordyn Rose*'s bow toward a beach on the northern side of the mouth of the Naknek River, and he beached the vessel, without damaging it. The captain planned to resolve the throttle issue while the vessel was beached and get back underway when the tide came back in about 12 hours later.

Once beached, the captain shut down the main engine and generator, leaving seven onboard batteries as the only electrical power source. The batteries powered the cabin lights, other electronics, and a diesel-fueled accommodation heater. The heater unit was affixed to a fiberglass bulkhead on the port side of the engine room and routed heated air via two ducts to the main cabin and bunk areas. The captain noted that, while the vessel was beached, the batteries remained on to power the heater, but he turned other electronics off to conserve the batteries.

Shortly after beaching the vessel, the captain took a nap in the main cabin, and the deckhand went below to the bunk area. As the tide receded, the *Jordyn Rose* developed a port list. About 1030, the captain awoke to the smell of smoke and noticed smoke "wafting out of the bunk area," but he did not see any flames or hear any alarms. He called down to the bunk area for the deckhand multiple times, but there was no response. The captain retrieved a portable fire extinguisher from the main cabin, and, as he was about to enter the bunk area, he saw the deckhand on the

[3] It is not uncommon for captains to beach their vessels in this area of Alaska due to the large tidal range.

beach running toward the vessel. (The deckhand had exited the vessel before the fire started and had been walking along the beach.) According to the captain, the cabin began to fill with smoke, so he did not enter the bunk area and, instead, abandoned the vessel, joining the deckhand on the beach.

The captain told investigators that, within a couple of minutes of abandoning the vessel, he saw flames spread to the main cabin area. While walking away from the burning vessel, the captain heard an explosion, which he attributed to a propane tank used for the galley stove. The tank had been secured to an aluminum handrail on the flybridge.

At 1048, the captain called 911, and the dispatcher notified the Bristol Bay Borough Fire Department. Firefighters arrived on scene at 1055. At 1534, the fire was extinguished, and the firefighters departed the scene.

The captain and deckhand remained on scene to clean up debris; the captain noted that the large debris (such as the propane tank) was "thrown back in" the boat. Later that afternoon, the vessel was loaded onto a trailer and transported back to the boat yard where they had launched the boat earlier that day.

The vessel sustained severe fire damage and was a total loss at an assessed value of $910,000.

Two days after the fire, a survey was conducted on behalf of the vessel's insurer. The surveyor found that the most severe fire damage was near the port bow, and that this was likely where the fire originated (see figure 3).

Figure 3. Fire damage to the *Jordyn Rose* bow (facing forward). (Background source: Alaska Survey Associates)

Although not required because the *Jordyn Rose* operated less than 3 miles from the baseline, the captain (who owned the vessel through his company) elected to have US Coast Guard dockside safety exams, completed in June 2024 (1 week before the fire), June 2022, and June 2021.[4] The only deficiency was noted in 2022, for an immersion suit issue.

The captain was not sure if the *Jordyn Rose* had smoke or fire detectors installed. There was no requirement for the vessel to have smoke or fire detectors.

[4] Under the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, commercial fishing vessel safety examinations are required once every 5 years for fishing vessels that operate 3 miles beyond shore. These safety examinations help ensure that all the required safety equipment and systems on board are in serviceable condition; examinations do not include the hull, electrical systems, or machinery as required for Coast Guard-inspected vessels.

2 Analysis

While the fishing vessel *Jordyn Rose* was beached—a common practice in the area—near the mouth of the Naknek River near Naknek, Alaska, the vessel caught fire. The local fire department extinguished the fire; the vessel was a total loss.

The captain was awoken from a nap by smoke and then saw smoke coming from the below-deck bunk area into the main cabin. After abandoning the vessel, he observed flames spreading into the main cabin from the bunk area. The captain's observations were consistent with the postfire survey report, which indicated that the greatest amount of fire damage, and likely area of origin, was near the port bow. Additionally, photos taken by the captain immediately after abandoning the vessel showed the fire near the port bow before it spread to the rest of the vessel (see figure 1).

While beached, the *Jordyn Rose*'s diesel main engine and electrical generator were off, leaving seven onboard batteries as the vessel's power source. Based on the captain's statements, the propane tank for the galley stove exploded well after the fire was discovered and was not located in the below-deck area where the captain first observed the smoke. This limited the possible ignition sources to the onboard batteries, associated electrical wiring, diesel-fueled accommodation heater, or other energized electrical components. However, due to the significant fire damage to the *Jordyn Rose* and onboard components, the ignition source and sequence could not be determined.

Due to the extent of the damage, investigators could not determine whether the vessel was equipped with smoke or fire detectors, and the *Jordyn Rose* captain could not confirm if any smoke or fire detectors were installed. Because the captain did not hear any alarms, it is likely that none were installed. While the captain completed voluntary dockside exams in 2024, 2022, and 2021, these exams did not address the presence or functionality of smoke and fire detectors. (The vessel was not required to have smoke or fire detectors.) Therefore, there was no way to alert the sleeping captain to the fire. The captain observed smoke coming from the bunk area only after he woke up, and by the time he retrieved a fire extinguisher, the smoke had become too dense, and he was forced to abandon the vessel. Had smoke or fire detectors been installed, the captain would have been alerted to the fire sooner and had more time to respond.

3 Conclusions

3.1 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the fire aboard the fishing vessel *Jordyn Rose* was an undetermined interior source near the port bow of the vessel.

3.2 Lessons Learned

Installation of Smoke and Fire Detectors on Fishing Vessels

Although not required on most commercial fishing vessels, smoke and fire detectors allow for the earliest detection and notification of a fire, maximizing the time operators have to respond to the fire or abandon the vessel. Vessel operators can improve fire safety by installing detectors in all areas susceptible to fire (such as the engine room and galley), and the detectors should be capable of notifying crewmembers throughout the vessel of fire or smoke.

Vessel Particulars

Vessel	*Jordyn Rose*
Type	Fishing (Fishing vessel)
Owner/Operator	MEM Enterprises LLC (Commercial)
Flag	United States
Port of registry	Friday Harbor, Washington
Year built	2011
Official number	1236972 (US)
IMO number	N/A
Classification society	N/A
Length (overall)	32.0 ft (9.8 m)
Breadth (max.)	14.0 ft (4.3 m)
Draft (casualty)	3.5 ft (1.1 m)
Tonnage	18 GRT
Engine power; manufacturer	750 hp (559 kW); John Deere 13.5L diesel engine

NTSB investigators worked closely with our counterparts from **Coast Guard Sector Western Alaska and US Arctic** throughout this investigation.